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Abstract. The purpose of this study is to examine the matching of new 
accountants with accounting firms in Japan. A notable feature of the 
present study is that it brings a computer algorithm to the job-hiring task. 
Job recruitment activities for new accountants in Japan are one-time, short-
term struggles. Accordingly, many have searched for new rules to replace 
the current ones of the process. Job recruitment activities for new 
accountants in Japan change every year. This study proposes modifying 
these job recruitment activities by combining computer and human efforts. 
Furthermore, the study formulates the job recruitment activities by using a 
model and conducting experiments. As a result, the Deferred Acceptance 
(DA) algorithm derives a high truth-telling percentage, a stable matching 
percentage, and greater efficiency compared with the previous approach. 
This suggests the potential of the Deferred Acceptance algorithm as a 
replacement for current approaches. In terms of accurate percentage and 
stability, the DA algorithm is superior to the current methods and should 
be adopted.  
1 Introduction  
The purpose of this study is to present an improvement plan to address the problems of 
the labor market in Japan for Certified Public Accountants (CPA). Japan's successful CPA 
applicants do their job hunting simultaneously. Job hunting is a short-term, decisive battle. 
Consequently, accounting firms seek to obtain excellent, successful candidates [1]. The 
problem with this short-term, decisive battle has been noted previously. The problem has 
been identified in the United States labor market for medical doctors. However, the labor 
market of the United States for medical doctors has solved the problem using a computer 
algorithm. The labor market of Japanese medical doctors uses the same method. This study 
compares the labor market of these doctors and accountants and considers whether it is 
possible to use a computer algorithm in the labor market of the accountants. 
The approach of this study is an analysis of game theory, which is referred to as 
matching theory [2]. The important point is the analysis of job hunting in game theory. 
Game theory can be used to discuss the design of institutions. The research method of this 
study is experimental research. Multiple alternatives may be compared in the experiment. 
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Carrying out the proposed analysis can result in pre-verification, with the aim of improving 
institutional design [3]. 
This paper is organized as follows. First, Section 2 reviews the previous studies and 
provides an overview of the labor market of the accountants. Next, Section 3 considers an 
effective algorithm for the solution of this problem. Section 4 then considers the 
experimental design. The results are shown in Section 5. Section 6 completes the discussion 
by showing the conclusions and noting future challenges.  
2 Previous studies and an overview of the labor market of the 
new accountants 
For new accountants, entering the labor market of Japan involves a short-term, decisive 
battle. Why has this become a short-term battle? To answer that question, it is necessary to 
understand the specific circumstances of Japan. First, consider the outline below. 
Accounting jobs in Japan are the first jobs for many of the successful candidates. The 
majority of successful candidates are university students. The Japanese Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (JICPA) oversees the new accountants in Japan’s labor market. The 
JICPA conducts self-regulation to ensure that job hunting is carried out in a fair manner. 
The self-regulation of the JICPA is a fairly strong, compelling force for accounting firms. 
The JICPA has issued a notice every year for the accounting firms in Japan. The notice 
defines in detail the start dates for corporation briefings, interviewing, job offer 
notifications, and the like. Additionally, these rules change each year. The latest rules were 
published in 2015 [4]. This recent timeline is provided in Figure 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Timeline of the current rules of job recruitment activities for new accountants. 
 
To understand this figure, one must understand differences in regions and sizes. 
The JICPA is divided into three accounting firm groups: (1) Tokyo district of major 
accounting firms, (2) Kansai district of major accounting firms, and (3) other regions with 
major accounting firms and small and medium-sized accounting firms. Here, the major 
accounting firms are the Big 4. More specifically, the Big 4 consists of Ernst & Young, 
Deloitte, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers. The Kansai region includes Osaka, Kyoto, 
and Kobe. 
Accounting firms have been requested to comply with the rules of the JICPA. 
Accordingly, recruitment activities proceed along the schedule of Fig 1. This figure 
indicates that the recruitment activities of small and medium-sized accounting firms begin 
first. For accounting firms of small and medium size, it is possible to hold an explanatory 
meeting immediately after the end of the CPA exam. Accounting firms of small and 
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medium size can also start the job interview process immediately after the CPA exam 
results are announced, and they can begin sending offer letters. Then the recruiting 
activities of Kansai and Tokyo’s major accounting firms begin. Specifically, Kansai and 
Tokyo’s major accounting firms can hold explanatory meetings beginning on November 
16. They can start job interviews on November 23. A major accounting firm in the Kansai 
region is able to begin sending offer letters on November 23. However, major accounting 
firms in Tokyo start sending offer letters after December 3. According to the JICPA, 
accounting firms will not be able to make an offer to a specific person before the "offer 
letter start." The further details of this rule are as follows: 
Type 1. For the major audit firms’ Tokyo offices, explanatory meetings start November 
16 (Monday) (application acceptance starts November 13 (Friday) 12:00), job interviews 
start November 23 (Monday) 9:00 (application acceptance starts November 19 (Thursday) 
15:00), and offer letters begin after December 3 (Thursday) 9:00 (the joining acceptance 
period is December 5 (Saturday) 12:00). 
Type 2. For the major audit firms’ Kansai district offices, explanatory meetings start 
November 16 (Monday) morning (application acceptance starts November 13 (Friday) 
12:00), job interviews start November 23 (Monday) 9:00 (application acceptance starts 
November 19 (Thursday) 15:00), and offer letters begin any time from the start of the 
interviews (the joining acceptance period is November 27 (Friday) 17:00). 
Type 3. For firms that are not Kansai or Tokyo major accounting firms, including small 
and medium-sized accounting firms, explanatory meetings can be conducted any time after 
the end of the CPA exam. However, acceptance of the job interview is carried out after the 
exam results are announced. The explanatory meeting and offer letter start are determined 
via consultation in each region. 
In this way, the accounting firms may be subject to any of three rules. The application 
of the rules differs according to firm size and region. A notable aspect of this rule is that the 
joining acceptance period is established in the Kansai and Tokyo's major accounting firms. 
Additionally, the joining acceptance deadline has been designated by both date and time. 
After the joining acceptance deadline of the major accounting firms in the Kansai region 
passes, the starting date for offer letters of Tokyo's major accounting firms begins. 
Accordingly, a person who has accepted a job offer form a major accounting firm in the 
Kansai region cannot possibly consider joining a major accounting firm in Tokyo. 
Therefore, job hunting for new accountants has become something like a bet. The most 
typical case is for an accountant to accept a job in Kansai despite wanting to work in 
Tokyo. Others accept jobs in small and medium-sized firms even though they want to work 
in Tokyo or Kansai. In other words, Tokyo and Kansai’s major accounting firms have 
missed the opportunity to acquire top talent. The current rules for new accountants and 
accounting firms are inefficient. However, the accounting firms that are small or medium-
sized and those offices of the Big 4 that are not in Tokyo or Kansai might gain excellent 
employees that could not be obtained without the current rules. In this way, the interests of 
the audit firms have conflicted. The JICPA has proceeded by trial and error. However, the 
employment recruitment of new accountants and audit firms remains, basically, an 
irreversible "one-shot deal." 
3 Model: Computational algorithm  
Consider the real world to be of the essence, as discussed in the previous section. An 
offer letter that an audit firm sends out is an exploding offer. It must be answered 
immediately. The new accountant must choose to accept or reject by the deadline. 
In this section, we consider a job recruitment activity that combines computers and 
humans. First, I consider a valid computer algorithm to solve this problem. Other 
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professionals in the labor market, according to previous studies, are subject to a residency 
(training physician) matching. The matching of training physicians with hospitals is being 
analyzed in the field. Such research has been applied to the real world [2]. 
Previous research identifies three criteria for determining the desirability of matching 
[2]. They are: (1) truth telling, (2) stability, and (3) efficiency. 
 1. Truth telling: The truth telling criteria is the requirement that job searchers make 
honest decisions regarding their preferences. Often, people lie to themselves in the process 
of job hunting. It is better, however, to job hunt honestly without lying to oneself. 
2. Stability: The stability criteria is that everyone in the state that does not have an 
incentive to the ran missing. Conversely, matching parties that do not have a mutual 
affection results in employment situations that are not stable. 
3. Efficiency: The efficiency criteria are that of Pareto efficiency in welfare economics. 
One algorithm that satisfies the truth telling and stability criteria is the Deferred 
Acceptance (DA) algorithm [5]. This algorithm has been applied to the real world in 
training physicians matching and school matching. The DA algorithm is as follows. 
Step 1: Each new accountant applies for his/her first choice of accounting firms. Each 
accounting firm accepts new accountants until its capacity is filled. Each accounting firm 
declines the rest of the new accountants. 
Step k: New accountants that were refused in the k-1 step apply for their first choices in 
the accounting firms that are not otherwise specified. Each accounting firm compares the 
new entrants and keeps the new accountant. Each accounting firm declines the rest of the 
new accountants. 
End: The algorithm is terminated when the new accountants who were refused are gone. 
Each accounting firm will have formally adopted new accountants that it will keep. 
Actually, though, new accountants do not apply, and accounting firms do not decide to 
keep them. Essentially, a centralized third party makes the matching determination using a 
computer. Specifically, JICPA and the Financial Services Agency could cooperate to 
accomplish this. This is realistic because there is precedent in the cooperation of the 
Medical Association and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare with a third party 
organization. 
4 Experimental Design 
The experimental design was based on previous research referenced [2, 6]. The 
experiment targeted Doshisha University undergraduates in July 2013 and January 2014. A 
total of 131 people participated in the following two treatments. The CR (current rule) 
involved 35 people and the DA (Deferred Acceptance) involved 96 people a subset of 33 
people was examined.  
The subjects played the role of new accountants' job hunting with three accounting 
firms, in three-person sets. The hiring capacity of the three accounting firms is one person 
each. The subjects participate in the experiment for only one of the two conditions (i.e., CR 
or DA). I conducted a between-subjects design experiment. The experimental procedure 
consisted of the following steps: First, the experimenter explained the instructions. The 
experimenter answered any questions. Then the experimenter distributed a document 
stating the true preference ranking of each subject. The true preference ranking that was 
distributed to each of the subjects constituted private information. The subjects could not 
know the true preference order of other subjects. Subjects of the CR treatment were either 
selected or not selected for entry into each of the accounting firms. For subjects of the DA 
treatment, three rankings of the accounting firms were selected. Each condition was subject 
to decision only once. Subjects did not perform repetitive decisions. In addition to having 
gained the psychological data, the experimenter performed a post-questionnaire of 
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behavioral data for both conditions. Incidentally, the preference order of the accounting 
firms and the conditions were fixed. In addition, the decision-making of each audit firm 
was performed by a computer. Each accounting firm of the CR treatment selected higher 
preference order new accountants. Additionally, each accounting firm of the DA treatment 
expressed the true preference ranking. Such accounting firms submitted their data without 
faking the ranking of their desire for new accountants. The true preference rankings of 
these accounting firms was information that was not known to all subjects. Subjects won 
three points when they were assigned to the first position of an audit firm. Subjects won 
two points when they were assigned to the second position of an audit firm. Subjects won 
one point when they were assigned to the third position of an audit firm. The mean duration 
of the experiment was about 30 minutes. It should be noted that experiments were carried 
out context-free. I set the following parameters in the experiment. 
 
Table 1. True preference ranking of the new accountants. 
 New accountant 1 New accountant 2 New accountant 3 
First rank Type 2 Type 1 Type 1 
Second rank Type 1 Type 2 Type 2 
Third rank Type 3 Type 3 Type 3 
 
Table 2. True preference ranking of the accounting firms. 
 Accounting firm 1 Accounting firm 2 Accounting firm 3 
First rank New accountant 1 New accountant 2 New accountant 2 
Second rank New accountant 3 New accountant 1 New accountant 1 
Third rank New accountant 2 New accountant 3 New accountant 3 
5 Results 
This section shows the experimental results. Three of the results indicate the desirability 
of the criteria for matching are "truth telling, stability, and efficiency. 
Result 1. The DA treatment has a higher truth-telling percentage than the CR treatment.  
Statistical evidence. I conducted a Welch Two Sample t-test for the difference between 
the mean values of the two treatments. Under each mechanism, the null hypothesis of equal 
proportions of truth-telling revelation across the two treatment settings can be rejected at 
the 1% significance level. t = -3.125, df = 63.959, p-value = 0.003. The mean of truth 
telling is listed in the following table.  
Result 2. The DA treatment has a higher stable matching percentage than the CR 
treatment. 
Statistical evidence. I conducted a Welch Two Sample t-test for the difference between 
the mean values of the two treatments. Under each mechanism, the null hypothesis of equal 
proportions of stable matching revelation across the two treatment settings can be rejected 
at the 1% significance level. t = -3.796, df = 17.101, p-value = 0.001. The mean of stable 
matching outcomes is listed in the following table.  
Result 3. The DA treatment has higher efficiency than the CR treatment. 
Statistical evidence. I conducted a Welch Two Sample t-test for the difference between 
the mean values of the two treatments. Under each mechanism, the null hypothesis of equal 
proportions of efficiency across the two treatment settings can be rejected at the 5% 
significance level. t = -2.725, df = 12.079, p-value = 0.018. The mean of efficiency is listed 
in the following table. 
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 Table 3. The proportion of truth telling, stability, and efficiency. 
 CR DA 
Truth telling 30.3% 66.7% 
Stability 9.0% 72.7% 
Efficiency 72.7% 87.0% 
 
Therefore, the DA treatment was found to exhibit higher truth telling, stability, and 
efficiency than the CR treatment. 
6 Conclusion 
In this paper, I compare the current rules and the DA algorithm. The main results of this 
study are as follows: 1) The DA treatment has a higher truth-telling percentage than the CR 
treatment. The way in which current rules tend to apply for a small accounting firm was 
observed. 2) The DA treatment has a higher stable matching percentage than the CR 
treatment. 3) The DA treatment has higher efficiency than the CR treatment. 
These results lead to the following suggestions. Under the current rules for new 
accountants, people who engage in job hunting do not pursue their true preference. Stable 
matching is low under the current rules. The Deferred acceptance alternative to the current 
rules can solve these problems. It will ensure that new accountants are able to express their 
true preference rankings. Moreover, it will result in stable matching. This is a good thing 
for both new accountants and accounting firms. Efficiency is a measure that has been 
considered desirable in traditional accounting and economics. However, truth telling and 
stability are measures that are used in market design, matching theory, and game theory. 
Accordingly, humans need to take advantage of the power of the computer algorithm. 
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